This article presents new estimates for investment and new growth accounts for three socialist economies between 1950 and 1989. Government statistics reported distorted measures for both the rate and the trajectory of productivity growth in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland. Researchers have benefited from revised output data, but have continued to use official statistics on capital input, or estimated capital stock from official investment data. Investment levels and rates of capital accumulation were much lower than officially claimed and over-reporting worsened over time. A setback in factor accumulation-both investment in equipment and labour inputcontributed very significantly to the socialist growth failure of the 1980s.
T he relative economic decline of eastern Europe after 1945 has been linked to institutional failure. The inefficiency of central planning compared to the market economy is well established, both theoretically and empirically.
1 Socialism, it has been argued, was relatively successful in mobilizing resources but stifled innovation and entrepreneurship. Planned economies thus achieved 'a satisfactory productivity performance in the era of mass production, but could not adapt to the requirements of flexible production technology', which contributed to their collapse in the 1980s.
2 They maintained high labour participation rates and invested heavily in physical capital but were inefficient compared to western market economies in their use of production factors and intermediate inputs. 3 We do not refute the idea that the planned economy was inefficient, but the above characterization of the socialist growth experience requires revision. As the literature review will show, the majority of existing growth accounts demonstrate productivity failure in socialist economies. We consider these results to be biased by the inconsistent use of data on output and factor inputs. Researchers have benefited from revised data on national incomes that yielded more modest growth rates than what the government statistics implied, but they have continued to use official figures on capital formation. Under central planning, investment statistics are difficult to trust. We show that socialist economies invested considerably less in physical capital than previously claimed. Likewise, employment statistics overstate the growth of labour input as average work hours declined over time. We suggest a greater role for factor inputs and a smaller one for productivity in the relative decline of eastern Europe. Moving beyond total factor productivity (TFP), we demonstrate an accumulation failure during the last decade of communism. Our findings imply fundamental differences between the growth experience of small socialist countries and what we know from the accounts of the Soviet economy over the same period.
We reconstruct investment series for the aggregate economy in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland from 1950 to 1989 and derive capital accumulation from these estimates. We adjust employment for changes in average work hours and educational attainment. We then use these new data on factor inputs to establish new growth accounts. Weighted input growth in all three countries began to slow down in the 1960s and in Hungary and Poland turned negative after 1980. Labour productivity growth remained respectable until the fall of communism, even though structural change had an adverse effect on productivity during the 1980s. Average rates of TFP growth fell considerably after the postwar golden age. However, their continued decline after 1980 was much less dramatic. All three economies ran out of steam not so much because of diminishing rates of productivity growth but because of inadequate factor accumulation.
Technological inefficiencies contributed to this growth retardation, but focusing only on these paints an incomplete picture. External shocks affecting both the supply of imports and public spending on investment projects played a very important role too. They invoked austerity policies that ignited public discontent and undermined the economic legitimacy of communism. Two such shocks hit eastern Europe simultaneously. First, rising oil prices made socialist industries less competitive because they made use of energy-intensive technologies, while fuel imports became more expensive. Second, the refinancing of their external debt, which had expanded throughout the 1970s, became more costly as western creditor nations raised interest rates to combat inflation at home. Socialist governments responded by limiting imports and by reducing international borrowing. Consequently, even where GDP continued to grow, domestic absorption stagnated or declined. Scarce resources were allocated to consumption and social infrastructure to satisfy popular demands. Thus equipment investment became the victim of austerity. Insufficient machinery investment, in turn, thwarted both technological modernization and employment creation. Labour input declined further with shorter official workweeks and popular welfare measures that reduced female labour participation.
Our growth accounts bring the experience of east-central Europe after the postwar golden age closer to what the literature has described for developing regions following their flirtation with import-substituting industrialization. By contrast, it differs from what we know about the Soviet economy, which was hampered by the wasteful allocation of resources that the boom in hydrocarbons mobilized. The crisis of the 1980s in east-central Europe was not idiosyncratic and did not result from the inefficiencies attributed to the socialist system. This does not mean that technological or allocation inefficiencies can be refuted; indeed there is plentiful evidence for their existence. However, they are not the sole reason for the loss of momentum in economic growth after 1980; insufficient factor accumulation was equally important, if not more so.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. After a brief literature review, we discuss the data and describe our methodology to estimate investment and capital stock in section II. Section III reports our new estimates, compares the imputed investment ratios across countries, and contrasts these with data on southern European economies. In section IV, we reconstruct the aggregate growth accounts of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland, and discuss the role of structural change. Section V explains the crisis of the 1980s, before section VI concludes. Online appendix S1 describes the sources we used to reconstruct investment. We report investment and capital stock by year in online appendix S2 and robustness checks in online appendix S3.
I
The theory of socialist development reaches back to the marxian concept of extended reproduction. Feldman formalized this concept and alongside Preobrazhensky stressed the role of the state in accumulating resources for investment.
4 Primary socialist accumulation was used to justify state intervention in late-developing nations, as it 'provided for lacking prerequisites'.
5
Even though recent scholarship has downplayed the role of economic motives underlying the Stalinist industrialization programme, 6 Allen reinterpreted Soviet industrialization in the 1930s as 'Feldman and Preobrazhensky in action'. Centralized resource allocation, with the simultaneous application of output planning and soft budget constraints, favoured heavy industry.
7 Earlier, Nurkse had posited that capital accumulation in poor countries generated rapid growth through the reallocation of inefficiently employed farm labour into industry. High rates of investment yielded fast growth as long as this labour surplus was not absorbed. 8 Common to these interpretations is that they did not define the role of technology and did not specifically acknowledge the limits of extensive growth. Horvat was among the first to introduce diminishing returns into the theory of socialist development, with the capacity to absorb new capital limited by the supply of labour.
9
The failure of socialist economies has been blamed on the neglect of technological progress and inefficient investment.
10 These factors were complemented by the high and growing material intensity of production. State enterprises operating with soft budget constraints maximized their investment allocations and intermediate inputs regardless of the expected returns. This evolved into a shortage economy, in which profit maximization was replaced by resource hunger that undermined productivity and innovation.
11 Shortages emerging from poor allocation are believed to have become more disruptive as planned economies modernized. Grey markets emerged to satisfy increasingly complex consumer demands and to reallocate intermediate inputs between firms.
12 Input-output data indicate that, on average, the material intensity of production was higher in socialist countries than in western market economies and that this gap widened after the mid-1970s. 13 Krugman articulated the dominant view on planned development, suggesting that authoritarian growth was unsustainable in the long run.
14 Early success, he argued, came from 'perspiration' (factor accumulation), followed by an inevitable slowdown because of the lack of 'inspiration' (innovation and creative entrepreneurship). Krugman's characterization of the East Asian growth miracles as the product of neoclassical transition dynamics received support from quantitative research, 15 but has since been convincingly refuted. Official statistics overstated capital accumulation; TFP contributed strongly to the catching up of newly industrialized countries between 1960 and 1990. 16 By contrast, extensive growth remained the mainstream interpretation of socialist development. Most research conducted on the USSR and central Europe reported high productivity growth for the 1950s and, in some cases, the 1960s, followed by rapid deceleration. For the Soviet economy, most studies found negative TFP growth during the late 1970s and the 1980s. 17 Brada applied a frontier production function to examine eastern European manufacturing performance between 1960 and 1985 and confirmed the declining rate of TFP growth, especially after 1980. 18 This conventional story of productivity failure is, at least in part, the product of statistical illusion. Growth accounts derived entirely from official statistics on both output and factor inputs suggested no such failure, but rather constant or increasing rates of TFP growth until the early 1980s. 19 Signs of a productivity meltdown emerged from subsequent research that benefited from revised national income data but that continued to use official statistics on capital accumulation or estimated capital stock from inflated official investment data. New cross-country evidence has only made good on these shortcomings in part. The last version (5.6) of the Penn World Tables (PWT) to include all socialist countries reported investment ratios of almost or more than 30 per cent across eastern Europe throughout the 1970s and 1980s. 20 Recent updates of the PWT suggest dramatically lower investment rates for some of the former socialist countries, thanks to the introduction of post-1990 benchmarks based on market prices, but still report high rates of capital accumulation and zero, or even negative, TFP growth for the 1980s. 21 We demonstrate that, in addition to productivity, factor inputs played a prominent role in the relative decline of socialist economies. Rather than recording modest growth rates despite very high levels of investment, central European countries fell behind, in large part, because they invested much smaller proportions of their national income in productive capital than fastergrowing market economies, especially in southern Europe. This finding differs fundamentally from what we know about the retardation of the Soviet economy over the same period.
II
Socialist national accounts must be treated with suspicion. Data on physical units of production are considered comparatively trustworthy. Eastern European scholars often used such measures as a proxy for economic growth and the standard of living.
22 By contrast, national income statistics were distorted by unrealistic producer prices, incorrect weighting of sectoral output, and inappropriate indexnumber methods.
23 Independent western research has established alternative estimates based on the System of National Accounts. They used official data only on physical output to construct time series that they linked to independently established benchmarks, which aggregated output by industry and sector using factor-cost weights. 24 The Research Project on National Income in East Central Europe carried out the most substantial work. It reported GNP for several countries including Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland, which have been widely used in empirical research and remain the main source of the Maddison data for the period 1950-89. 25 The same working papers provide evidence on GNP by sector of origin of product. 26 We obtain employment data from official publications. 27 In the absence of comprehensive government statistics on labour hours outside industry, we follow a shortcut method to adjust total employment for changes in average work hours. If we assume that the number of extra hours that employees were required to work did not change dramatically over time, then, for the economy as a whole, the official workweek is a good indication of actual work hours. We have exact figures on the total hours worked in Hungary after 1980, which confirm the accuracy of our approach.
28 Legislation on the official workweek and its implementation are well documented. In addition, for Czechoslovakia and Poland, we assume that in 1989 at least 5 per cent of contract hours were lost due to the extensive strikes. To adjust labour input for returns to education, we use the most recent Barro-Lee data on average years of schooling for the adult working-age population.
29
For investment and capital stock, we generate new data that we consider more reliable than official statistics or scholarly estimates built on them. Socialist 22 Bródy, 'GDP'; Ehrlich, 'Contest'. 23 On the methodology of socialist national accounts, see Horvat, 'Conceptual background'; Kaser, 'Survey'. 24 On the construction of the benchmarks, see Alton, Bass, Czirják, and Lazarcik, Statistics; Alton, Bass, Lazarcik, and 30 However, gross capital formation was also magnified by additional items, such as the training of personnel, R&D, and inventories, which were fabricated in order for the main components of national accounts to match. Government accounts were often internally inconsistent; for instance, when the sum of construction and machinery investment did not even approximate the value of gross fixed capital formation in the national accounts. Past investment data were frequently revised, especially for the 1950s and for Poland, in order for the current rate of capital formation to appear higher relative to earlier periods. The sources of these inconsistencies are difficult, and often impossible, to identify.
Investment statistics appeared consistent at the time with capital stock levels because government figures overstated capital depreciation, not just gross investment. For Hungary, the statistical yearbooks reported total depreciation by asset type from 1985 onward. These values imply depreciation rates of approximately 10 per cent for equipment, which are much higher than researchers applied pre-1960 and almost as high as they assumed for the period 1960-2000 for Spain.
31 Given that socialist economies extended the service lives of both machinery and transport equipment, these depreciation rates are implausible. State enterprises seem to have made excessive use of their allowance to write off depreciated assets, which may have helped them overstate their needs for capital replacement and thus their claim for investment funds.
We determine capital stock with the perpetual-inventory method developed by economists and social accountants to build up stocks of capital from flows of investment.
Following this approach, the stock of fixed capital in a given year evolves according to the value of new investments made in that year and the depreciation of the existing stock.
The capital stock (K) in year t is derived from the stock of the year t-1 by adding investment (I), more precisely gross fixed capital formation, and subtracting capital depreciation. The same method can be applied to estimate past capital stock from more recent levels with retrospective calculation. 33 The exact formula in 30 equation (2) measures the capital stock at the end of year t.
The depreciation rate δ is asset-specific and inversely related to the service life of the asset, with parameter R (declining balance) and T, the average service life typical for the type of asset. If R equals one, then depreciation is arithmetic. This pattern is typical for buildings and structures. Geometric depreciation, when R equals two, is more suitable for estimating the stock of machinery and equipment. Empirical studies adopted the 'modified' geometric depreciation pattern proposed by Jorgenson, which falls between the arithmetic and geometric patterns. 34 We take the depreciation of structures to be arithmetic and assume R = 1.5 for equipment, but we also run robustness checks with alternative depreciation patterns in online appendix S3.
Previous accounts of postwar growth have used a range of values for service life: 50-70 years are typical for dwellings, 30-40 years for other structures. 35 We use T = 50 until the late 1960s and T = 40 thereafter. Soaring public investment from 1968 in Czechoslovakia and Hungary and from 1971 in Poland shifted resources to transport infrastructure and modern standardized housing using cheap materials that were assumed to have shorter lifespans than traditional buildings. Previous studies have used asset lives of 10-25 years for machinery, with road transport vehicles and communications equipment, and more modern vintages of machinery, in general, thought to have faster depreciation. Since command economies were known for capital goods being kept beyond the point where they were fully depreciated by wear and tear, we assume long service lives for machinery: T = 25 in the early postwar decades, and T = 20 for the 1970s and 1980s. These assumptions imply depreciation rates of 2 per cent for structures and 6 per cent for equipment until 1967 (1970 for Poland) and rates of 2.5 per cent and 7.5 per cent respectively thereafter. The estimated rates of capital accumulation are not very sensitive to alternative values of T used in the literature that are plausible for the period and the countries we study. We report robustness checks in online appendix S3.
The perpetual inventory method requires data on the benchmark value of fixed assets and on levels of machinery and construction investment expressed in the prices of the benchmark year. The former cannot be independently established. We must cautiously select the most trustworthy official sources. For Czechoslovakia and Hungary, we use data from 1990, the first year after transition and the introduction of market prices for many capital goods, which can be directly linked with our new investment series. The reported values are plausible: they imply capital-output ratios close to 3, which is standard globally for this period.
36 Poland experienced hyperinflation in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. The best preinflation benchmark is 1971, when the country, following other nations in central Europe, introduced radical economic reforms that systematically revised official prices. The comprehensive revaluation of fixed assets in the socialist sector aimed at 34 See Jorgenson, 'Productivity', producer prices that better reflect factor costs, since enterprises were subsequently required to pay interest on their capital and could to write off depreciation. 37 These are the most reliable statistics for capital stock during the socialist period and the relative prices of the reform year approximate real factor costs most closely.
38
Previous studies have used alternative methods to estimate initial capital stock, especially when official data are not available, or cannot be relied upon to construct plausible benchmarks. The production-function approach, proposed by Harberger, determines the initial stock by the steady-state relationship between the initial level of investment, the growth of investment, and the rate of depreciation. 39 It has been used in empirical research on developing countries and on long-run growth. 40 However, it has the caveats that European economies were far from their steady state after the war and that it is difficult to establish the steady-state growth rate of investment. The recent PWT updates determine initial stock by assuming plausible capital-output ratios. This approach also becomes problematic in the postwar context, when factor proportions were temporarily dislocated from their norm.
Recent advances in estimating capital input used the concept of capital services, which has been applied in historical research. 41 This approach provides a more direct measure of capital inputs in production and the imputed ratio of capital input to stock can be used as an indicator of capital quality in the growth accounting formulae. However, it requires data on the rental price of capital. It is, therefore, inappropriate for centrally planned economies, where capital goods were directly allocated, and thus there were no market interest rates. The only solution to circumvent this problem would be to use values estimated for market economies, but this would imply critical assumptions about technology use. In addition, computing capital input would probably not yield rates of capital accumulation radically different from our estimates. Prados de la Escosura and Rosés found very similar rates of net capital formation for Spain using a battery of alternative computations, even in the postwar era of high growth. 42 We follow two strategies to construct new investment series. For the period 1950-67, the Research Project published independent estimates for investment in both equipment and structures that reflect the volume of investment goods and construction services.
43 They measure construction investment by gross output in construction that, in turn, is approximated by the availability of building materials. Equipment investment is estimated by the production of machinery and other 37 On the reforms in the three countries, see Staller, 'Czechoslovakia'; Balassa, 'Economic reform'; Kýn, 'Rise and fall'; Portes, 'Economic reforms'; Hare and Wanless, 'Polish and Hungarian economic reforms'; Kornai, 'Hungarian reforms'. 38 Official data for Czechoslovakia and Hungary report net capital stock for both machinery and structures in 1990. Polish statistics for 1971 only report gross capital stock. We derive net values using the ratio of net to gross stock in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, but we assume somewhat lower ratios, as the Polish capital stock in 1970 had to be considerably older, after decades of very low investment. 39 Harberger, 'Perspectives'. 40 Nehru and Dareshwar, 'New database'; Young, 'Tyranny of numbers'; Prados de la Escosura and Rosés, 'Sources'; eisdem, 'Capital accumulation'. 41 instruments, adjusted for net imports and disregarding year-to-year changes in inventories.
These are upper-bound estimates of actual investment. Until the mid-1960s, reported levels of machinery investment can be deemed accurate, as the share of consumer durables in engineering output remained very small, and items seldom used as capital goods-such as bicycles, motorcycles, and communication equipment-were subtracted from machinery output. 44 Military hardware may have carved out more substantial shares from engineering output, but we have no reliable data on the components of defence spending for the 1950s and early 1960s. Scholarly estimates using both detailed budgetary figures and proxy methods for the period after 1965 suggest that these shares never surpassed 5 per cent after adjusting for the arms trade, and were probably smaller because military hardware included equipment that could be put to productive use, such as transport vehicles. 45 Approximating construction investment by the volume of available building materials can be considered a plausible strategy for the entire period, provided that the value-added share of construction services remained constant. The literature has argued that waste in materials, if anything, increased over time, due both to the growing complexity of input requirements and to the long duration of building projects. 46 To the extent that these arguments hold, we go against our hypotheses by overstating the growth of investment and thus the rate of capital accumulation.
For the period after 1967, the Research Project did not publish similar estimates, since they would no longer have measured the level and structure of investment accurately. Instead, it reported an index of domestic final use, decomposed into three major items: household consumption, government consumption, and a residual. 47 The residual is largely gross capital formation but also includes subcomponents of public spending not listed under government consumption, most notably national defence and R&D, and changes in inventories.
For the period after 1965, we use the Research Project's index on construction to account for investment in structures, but we derive the index of equipment investment by decomposing the residual term of domestic absorption. 48 Specifically, for each year we subtract the index of military spending and of R&D reported elsewhere by the Research Project from the index of residual final use, weighting each sub-component by its share of total GDP in the benchmark years of the index-number series. 49 To determine these weights, we take disaggregate data on research outlays from official sources and total military expenditure as a percentage of GDP from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). 50 In light of the controversy about Soviet budgetary figures on national 44 Even in Austria, a more prosperous and consumer-oriented economy relative to socialist countries, very few private households owned modern appliances before the late 1960s. See Seidel,Österreichs Wirtschaft, tab. 1.13, p. 57. 45 Crane, 'Military spending', pp. 530-8. 46 For a theoretical explanation, see Banerjee and Spagat, 'Productivity paralysis'. 47 Alton, Badach, Bakondi, Bass, and Lazarcik, Eastern Europe; Alton et al., East European GNP. 48 We assume that aggregation errors were random and that the relative size of inventories did not change over time, since we cannot establish these items independently. 49 Alton et al., Economic growth; Alton et al., East European GNP. 50 SIPRI, Yearbook, 1980, p. 29; 1991, pp. 174-5. defence, one could question the reliability of this evidence. 51 However, previous research has shown data on military spending in central Europe to be much more accurate. Estimates constructed using wages and living costs for personnel expenses and input-output and trade statistics to determine material costs came close to budgetary figures. 52 The lack of transparency in government accounts was found to be much more serious in the Soviet Union than in the smaller Warsaw Pact countries.
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The index for equipment investment is obtained by subtracting the construction index from the index of fixed-capital investment. We assume that gross fixedcapital formation evolved as gross capital formation, disregarding changes in inventories that we cannot establish independently. In order to minimize the impact of aggregation errors and of unobserved swings in inventories, we smooth the indexnumber series for residual final use before we decompose this index. We then link our post-1965 index for equipment investment to the level estimates of the Research Project for the period 1950-67. The investment levels thus obtained are converted into prices of the benchmark years for capital stock using official price indexes for investments by asset type. 54 We discuss the methods used by the Research Project to estimate the different components of domestic final use in online appendix S1.
III
In this section, we compare our estimates for equipment and construction investment to official statistics. We then trace the share of gross capital formation in GDP and contrast these rates with the investment ratios of southern European countries. This exercise demonstrates that slow capital accumulation was instrumental in the falling behind of central Europe. We report investment and capital stock by year in online appendix S2. Figure 1 and figure 2 plot investment in Czechoslovakia and Hungary respectively. We compare these new estimates with official data on total investment, since government statistics on gross fixed-capital formation did not always distinguish between asset types.
Following the rapid recovery after the Second World War and a temporary setback in the early 1950s, investment continued to grow steadily until about 1970. Thereafter, the two economies took different paths. The share of equipment in total investment increased in Czechoslovakia until the mid-1970s. In Hungary, machinery investment declined from 1971 and in the 1980s fell back to levels that had been achieved two decades earlier. Construction investment began to diminish after 1978 but remained higher relative to earlier periods than equipment investment. In Czechoslovakia, construction stabilized after 1978, while machinery investment plummeted in the early 1980s and recovered after 1985. Over the last 20 years of Communism, capital accumulation focused more strongly on machinery in Czechoslovakia than in Hungary, even if during the 1980s the share of equipment investment fell considerably in both countries. This is not surprising given the 51 Epstein, 'Economic cost', p. 127; Davis, 'Defence sector', pp. 155-6; Harrison, 'Secrets', abstract. 52 These estimates are similar to the data published in Alton, Lazarcik, Bass, and Badach, 'East European defense', upon which we rely. 53 Clements, 'Costs'; Wiles, 'Soviet defence expenditures'. 54 The series might be affected by hidden inflation. If we were able to account for it, the real investment in the 1980s would have been even lower than in the earlier decades, strengthening our arguments even further. 1950 -1977 idem, Beruházásiévkönyv 1989, pp. 13-14; idem, Beruházásiévkönyv 1990, p. 3. structural differences between the two economies, which we discuss in the following section. The value-added share of the most mechanized sectors, especially industry, was larger in Czechoslovakia and continued to increase moderately even during the 1970s and 1980s, when it was already declining in Hungary. In both countries, retrospective official accounts underestimated investment during the 1950s and the early 1960s, but the rates of investment growth do not differ much from our estimates. By contrast, official data massively overstate the growth of investment during the 1970s and, therefore, investment levels in the 1980s. In reality, investment at best stagnated and most likely declined from the mid-1970s onward. The fall of investment after 1980 predominantly affected machinery investment. Even in Czechoslovakia, investment growth in the 1970s and 1980s was much less remarkable than officially claimed and resulted mainly from increasing outlays for building projects.
Poland represents a different case (see figure 3 ). Investment levels were very low after the war; the stock of fixed capital declined until 1950, and that of machinery until 1952. Investment growth resumed thereafter, but remained modest until the mid-1960s, contrary to the official statistics. Slow capital accumulation in this period reflected the unique factor proportions that the Polish economy inherited from the 1940s. Destruction of physical capital was substantial, for sure, but western research found contemporary Polish estimates deliberately exaggerative as they were meant to serve as a basis for reparations and foreign economic assistance.
55 Furthermore, most of the damage affected residential and transport infrastructure, rather than production equipment. 56 In fact, production capacity was enhanced significantly in the primary industries. Between 1938 and 1943, steel war had an even larger impact on the industrial labour force and especially skilled labour: 79 per cent of all victims were urban dwellers, the number of industrial workers declined by more than 20 per cent, the number of self-employed workers fell by more than 40 per cent, and employment in commerce was down 60 per cent. Both the Holocaust and the extensive purge of the Polish economic elites by the German occupiers reduced management personnel in engineering, trade, and finance even more. 59 As a result, the Polish economy faced labour shortages during the 1950s and therefore could grow into existing production capacities. After 1970, investment growth became explosive, both in construction and equipment, but only temporarily, and investment levels plummeted in the early 1980s more than they did in the other two countries.
Throughout the 1960s and until the mid-1970s, investment in machinery was catching up with levels of construction investment. From 1978, investments declined, but fell much more dramatically in equipment. The final collapse of investment activity after 1985 was entirely the product of sluggish machinery investment. Official figures report considerably faster investment growth after 1960, but the overstatement of growth rates in the 1970s was spectacular. It was suggested that investment doubled between 1972 and 1975. This and the apparent recovery after 1985 are serious distortions produced by official statistics, the source of which is difficult to identify.
Two core results stand out for all three economies. First, investment levels during the 1980s were much lower than official data had suggested, and much lower than researchers using these data believed. Second, capital formation slowed down in the last decade of communism mainly because of the sharp decline in machinery investment. Still, investment levels alone do not say much about growth dynamics. Rates of capital accumulation and of economic growth depend more on relative levels of investment, the ratio of gross capital formation to GDP. The PWT are the most commonly used source for investment ratios in cross-country investigations. Vonyó published a new set of investment rates across eastern Europe between 1950 and 1989, which reflect continuously increasing ratios until the 1970s and sharply falling rates in the 1980s, except for the Soviet Union. Socialist economies invested considerably smaller proportions of their national income than faster-growing nations in western Europe, except in the 1970s. 60 However, these investment ratios are upper-bound benchmark estimates that may reflect biased relative prices for investment goods and that included, in some cases, minor residual items of domestic final use other than investment.
We take a different approach. We derive benchmark investment rates from the last version of the PWT that reported data on all the former socialist countries in eastern Europe. PWT 5.6 reported investment rates both as real GDP components and in current international prices. For the benchmark year 1985, both shares were taken directly from official national accounts. We correct these benchmark rates for the proportional difference between our investment levels and official figures, assuming that this ratio for gross fixed-capital formation also holds for gross capital formation. The investment ratios for all other years are then interpolated using our 59 von Delhaes, Quellen, p. 17. 60 Vonyó, 'War and socialism', pp. 259-60. Table. constant-price investment series and Maddison's data on GDP. 61 We again assume that gross capital formation evolved over time in the same way as gross fixedcapital formation. Figure 4 reports striking results. Relative levels of investment in central Europe were rather modest, and fell dramatically during the 1980s. In both Czechoslovakia and Hungary, investment ratios surged during the collectivization drives of the early and late 1950s. In the late 1960s and the early 1970s, Hungary and Poland borrowed heavily from international creditors and used money from abroad to scale up investment. At other times, Polish investment rates were well below 20 per cent, and were very modest by the standards of the postwar era. Figure 5 compares investment ratios for the three central European countries weighted by their real GDP, with the weighted average rates calculated from the most recent PWT data for Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. PWT 9.0 reports investment shares in current international purchasing power parities (PPPs) using multiple benchmarks for GDP spending components. For OECD countries, these include 1975, 1980, 1985, and 1995 onward. Price indices are interpolated for all years between these benchmarks and extrapolated from 1975 for all previous years.
62 Since Italy had the most advanced economy in the region and was the only country with a democratic political system in place from the start of the period, we chart two alternative sets of investment ratios with and without Italy respectively. Except for the 1970s, central Europe lagged behind the market economies of southern Europe not just in rates of economic growth but also in rates of investment. The bar charts measured on the secondary vertical axis show Table' ), for southern Europe, weighted with GDP data from PWT 9.0 (output-side real GDP at current PPPs). Growth rates of GDP per capita established from Maddison, World economy, 477. that the largest growth differentials in real GDP per capita averaged over five-year periods between 1950 and 1990 typically correspond with the most substantial gaps in the investment ratios. This finding concurs with our recent research in that the falling behind of socialist economies can, to a large extent, be explained within a standard conditional convergence framework. 63 We reveal this to be true even for the 1980s, when the growth failure of central Europe in contrast to strong growth in southern Europe coincided with a striking divergence in investment activity between the two regions. Table 1 reports average growth rates of national income and factor inputs according to alternative sources and specifications. Previous research benefited from downward-revised estimates for the growth of national income. Official sources reported rapid growth until the late 1970s, followed by a sudden and sharp slowdown. In fact, socialist economies ran out of steam more gradually from the late 1960s onward. They were falling behind successful modernizers in both southern Europe and East Asia throughout the postwar period, not only after 1980. The extent to which government statistics overstated economic growth 63 Vonyó, 'War and socialism', pp. 261-6. was drastically reduced during the 1980s. We observe the opposite pattern in the capital-stock data. Our estimates show that official accounts overstated the rate of capital accumulation only after 1970 and the margin of error increased over time. This finding already suggests that previous research on the relative decline of socialist economies may have been seriously misled by faulty statistics. Polish official data were inaccurate even in comparison with the accounts of other socialist governments. The rate of capital accumulation was overstated even more than economic growth. Price distortions are the most likely culprit in the margin of error for the 1980s, when inflation spiralled out of control. Polish statistics on capital stock do not allow us to construct growth rates for the 1950s, meaning that our new estimates not only improve on the existing evidence but also extend it. The common feature in our figures for all three countries is that capital accumulation accelerated until the early 1970s, but the economic slowdown after 1980 coincided with sharply reduced rates of net capital formation. This is not the end of the story. Employment figures alone do not measure the growth of labour input accurately. In the 1970s and 1980s, which saw most of the reductions in weekly work hours, the total number of hours grew much more slowly than employment. In Czechoslovakia, the official workweek had already been shortened in the late 1950s and again a decade later. In addition, by the end of the 1980s, extensive strikes reduced actual labour input considerably in both Czechoslovakia and Poland. We made a conservative assumption that this effect cost only 5 per cent of contract hours in both countries in 1989. The adjusted growth rates show only modest labour expansion in Czechoslovakia between 1950 and 1970 and practically zero after 1980. In both Hungary and Poland, labour input declined sharply during the 1980s. This contraction did not just result from falling average work hours; total employment fell too.
IV
We use the standard growth accounting framework developed by Solow, which applies a Cobb-Douglas production function with constant returns to scale and constant elasticity of substitution (CES) equal to one between capital and labour.
Value-added Y in period t is the function of the capital stock (K), labour input (L), and TFP (A). The coefficients α and 1-α denote the elasticity of output with respect to capital and labour. Output growth can arise from the expansion of factor inputs or from TFP growth.
Equation (5) can be rewritten to express TFP growth as the proportion of labourproductivity growth unexplained by capital deepening, that is, the increase in the capital-labour ratio. This formula is more appropriate for assessing the nature of growth under central planning.
Growth accounts commonly use the value of 1/3 for α, which is a reasonable approximation of the share of capital in national income in advanced market economies. However, it has been argued that a higher capital share is more realistic for command economies. 65 Following this literature, we assume constant α of 0.4. In theory, if production factors are paid their marginal products, factor elasticities can be computed from data on factor costs. Since these are difficult to determine for centrally planned economies, we report robustness checks using both upper-bound and lower-bound plausible values for α in online appendix S3.
The growth accounting framework was developed for market, rather than centrally planned, economies. Nevertheless, we consider it a useful analytical tool even for the latter, where the central planner rather than the market determined prices and factor costs. Weitzman proposed that socialist economies were better represented by a production function with CES below one. 66 Easterly and Fischer argued the same for the Soviet Union, and Rusek for Czechoslovakia.
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However, we agree with Allen's rebuttal, supported by Crafts, that the technological possibilities available to planned and market economies did not differ profoundly enough to validate the assumption of radically different underlying production functions. 68 To the extent that Weitzman was correct, our approach would underestimate TFP growth, especially in the 1980s. Since unit CES does not 64 Solow, 'Technical change', p. 312. 65 Easterly and Fischer, 'Soviet economic decline', pp. 353-6. Higher capital shares were also estimated for developing countries, as in Benhabib and Spiegel, 'Role of human capital'. 66 Weitzman, 'Soviet postwar economic growth', pp. 678-82. 67 Easterly and Fischer, 'Soviet economic decline ', Rusek, 'Industrial growth', p. 305. 68 Allen, Farm to factory, Crafts, 'Solow', p. 208. fully capture diminishing returns to capital, it may overstate the contribution of higher capital-labour ratios to labour-productivity growth. Our estimates for TFP growth are, therefore, lower bound. We adjust labour input for returns to education, even though true returns are difficult to determine for centrally planned economies. Denison developed the first extended Solow model with education as a labour-augmenting factor, but we use the specification proposed by Hall and Jones.
Human capital-augmented labour (H) is defined as the product of labour input and the efficiency of labour with E years of schooling relative to its efficiency with no schooling. The derivative φ'(E) is the actual return to education and is estimated with Mincerian wage regressions.
Hall and Jones take the rate of return to be piecewise linear: 13.4 per cent for each of the first four years of education, 10.1 per cent for each of the next four years, and 6.8 per cent per year after the eighth year of schooling. 70 Previous research using the wage grid of socialist economies computed substantially lower returns to education, but we consider these estimates to be biased by the strong wage compression that socialist governments enforced. 71 These low rates reflect not so much the poor efficiency derived from education, but the modest monetary rewards offered for these efficiency gains. To the extent that the true returns to education were smaller than the global average rates, our refined estimates of TFP growth can also be considered lower bound. Letting h denote human capital per worker (H/L), TFP growth is computed as the residual of labour-productivity growth after subtracting the contributions of capital deepening and education.
Our revised growth accounts in table 2 paint a different picture from that of past research which underestimated labour-productivity growth from the 1960s, and overestimated the increase in the capital-labour ratio. The growth of labour productivity and TFP slowed down throughout the postwar era, but we obtain higher rates of TFP growth than the previously available data implied. The upward revision of productivity growth is most notable after 1970, especially for the 1980s. Hungary and Poland both recorded respectable rates of labour productivity growth until the end of communism, and while TFP growth slowed down after the golden age, it did not decline further between the 1970s and the 1980s. Czechoslovakia posted comparatively modest rates of productivity growth from the 1960s, but TFP growth remained positive and slowed down gradually. These results do not refute previous findings that socialist countries performed poorly relative to western 69 Denison, Sources; Hall and Jones, 'Some countries', pp. 87-8. 70 Hall and Jones, 'Some countries', p. 89. The underlying estimates come from Psacharopoulos, 'Returns to investment ', pp. 1328-9. 71 See Münich, Svejnar, and Terrell, 'Returns'; Jolliffe and Campos, 'Market liberalisation'. Notes: TFP (I) and TFP (II) are the residuals of growth accounts not accounting and accounting for educational attainment respectively. 'Education' refers to human-capital deepening and is the weighted contribution of average improvement in educational attainment to aggregate labour-productivity growth. Sources: Tab. 1; average educational attainment from http://barrolee.com/.
market economies, but they have important implications for our understanding of their growth failure during the 1980s and of the economic forces behind the fall of communism.
Poland represents a unique case. In contradiction to the standard view of socialist development, Polish growth in the early postwar period was driven entirely by labour expansion, not capital accumulation. The capital-labour ratio was markedly reduced during the 1950s, and then it stagnated until the late 1960s. This is prima facie evidence for increasing capacity utilization and for the existence of a vast capital surplus in the early years of communism. The most pressing challenge for Polish governments was not how to rebuild destroyed capital, but how to make use of existing capacities given the evident shortage of skilled labour, already recognized as the main bottleneck of reconstruction by the famous postwar economist Oskar Lange.
72 Consequently, there was little need for additional investment, which explains why the capital stock grew so slowly before 1970. With less investment in new equipment, labour-productivity growth was more modest than in other socialist countries. By contrast, soaring investment in the early 1970s and the sharp contraction of labour input during the 1980s made labourproductivity growth more and more investment-driven. Still, TFP growth remained positive, and slowed down gradually from the 1960s, rather than abruptly after 1980. 72 Lange, Probleme, cited in von Delhaes, Quellen, p. 19. Surplus capacities also have a role in explaining high TFP growth in Czechoslovakia during the 1950s. Due to the expulsion of ethnic Germans from the Sudetenland, the population decline after 1945 combined with robust capital accumulation during the war left Czech industry with surplus capital. Subsequent investment was used to adopt more capital-intensive production technology (which had its beginnings in the interwar years) and to substitute capital for scarce labour in agriculture, which lost a quarter of its workforce in the late 1950s. 73 The reallocation of farm workers into industry, in turn, reduced surplus capacity in manufacturing. The failure of the Polish economy to replicate this process was most likely the consequence of an initially weaker industrial base, especially in capacities to produce steel-based capital goods, and the failed attempts at collectivizing the farming sector. Input-output bottlenecks in the machinery sector arising from border effects and the differential impact of wartime destruction across industries, due to their different spatial concentration, may also be partly to blame.
Our main quantitative findings hold, for the most part, when we account for returns to schooling. Improvements in education and vocational training are among the least doubted achievements of socialism. Even when it came at the expense of teaching quality, educational standards increased, especially in primary schooling and technical education. However, since the growth of educational attainment was rather smooth over the socialist period, accounting for labour quality does not alter the trajectory of productivity growth, except for Poland in the 1960s and Hungary between the 1970s and the 1980s. As Poland recovered from the demographic shock it had suffered in the 1940s, the best educated young cohorts born after 1945 and newly entering the labour force made up a large share of the workingage population in the late 1960s. Labour qualifications improved little in Hungary after 1980, when the youngest working-age cohorts carried less weight in average attainment levels than the oldest workers, whose schooling had been disrupted during the war and the first postwar years.
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Figure 6 summarizes our main findings. As in many other regions of postwar Europe, the gradual slowdown of economic growth reflected declining rates of productivity growth. 75 However, the socialist growth failure after 1980 was mainly input-driven. This conclusion becomes even stronger when we recognize that structural change thwarted aggregate productivity growth in the 1980s. Given the emphasis that the literature placed on labour reallocation between agriculture and industry, our revision of the socialist growth record cannot be complete without some discussion of structural development.
Data limitations prevent us from being able to estimate the structural components of labour-productivity growth or of TFP growth. We do not have reliable evidence on capital input at the sector or industry level. In addition, the industry classification used in the official employment statistics is not consistent across the three countries and differs from the industry coverage of our sources for sectoral GDP data, especially in services. Finally, we do not have any way of estimating the hours worked outside mining and manufacturing. 73 Teichova, Czechoslovak economy, See the Barro-Lee data for details: http://barrolee.com/. 75 For comparisons, see Crafts and Toniolo, 'Postwar growth', p. 10; eisdem, 'Aggregate growth', p. 306; Maddison, 'Macroeconomic accounts', pp. 44, 59 . 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s Figure 6 . The proximate sources of growth in central Europe, 1950-89 Notes and sources: Rates of factor accumulation and GDP growth from tab. 1. lnTFP = lnGDP − lnTFI (total weighted factor input). Factor shares are 0.4 for capital and 0.6 for labour (see TFP I in tab. 3).
Therefore, any disaggregated measure of labour productivity or TFP that we could construct would not only be inaccurate and hard to compare across countries; it would be methodologically inconsistent with our productivity estimates for the economy as a whole. We can trace structural shifts in the growth of national income. Table 3 reports the share of six major sectors of the economy in GDP in constant prices. The share of industry stopped increasing by the late 1970s, but de-industrialization after the oil shocks was not as dramatic as in western market economies. Structural modernization lost momentum after the 1960s. In Hungary, the relative decline of agriculture came to a halt as early as the 1970s, and after 1980 the share of the farming sector in total value-added increased in all three countries. The view that central planning was not flexible enough to support a successful transition from an industrial to a more service-based economy needs qualification. Modern services, including trade, transport, and communications, took a great leap forward during the 1970s but contracted more than any other sector after 1980, most drastically in Poland. By contrast, the relative decline of non-material services, including the government, was reversed after 1980. As the following section will explain, this reversal of structural change in socialist economies was a response to exogenous shocks. Despite the industrialization drive of the 1950s and 1960s and the expansion of services from the 1970s, the overall pattern emerging from table 3 is one of remarkably little structural change over the 40-year period. This is largely a reflection of the fact that previous research accounted for sectoral shares in the labour force, not in GDP. The relative size of farm employment fell sharply until the 1970s, but to a large extent this was offset by much faster factor substitution in agriculture than in industry. of trade with western markets and Soviet industry was in grave need of imported western machinery, the fixed-price regime was abandoned and COMECON prices were determined as five-year moving averages of the world market price. The ensuing increase in import bills in central and south-eastern Europe was initially smoother and somewhat delayed, but lasted longer than elsewhere, until the mid-1980s.
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Rising fuel prices made socialist industries less competitive because they made use of fuel-intensive technologies. This was not the outcome of technical backwardness but of rational choice. Due to the vast fossil-fuel deposits of the COMECON, energy prices were both nominally and relatively lower than in the west until the late 1970s. It thus paid to employ fuel-inefficient technologies. This argument is supported by existing research on input use in manufacturing. Data derived from the material balances of socialist economies and input-output matrices constructed for OECD countries indicate that input-output ratios differed as much or more within these two groups of economies as between them, especially in manufacturing. 80 It was because of their consistently higher energy intensity that the input-output ratios of socialist economies on average appeared higher and that these ratios increased over time relative to market economies. 81 After the oil shocks, for socialist countries outside the Soviet Union, this implied the loss of competitiveness, worsening terms of trade, and the need for massive investments to replace the existing stock of fuel-inefficient equipment.
Second, public debt in eastern Europe soared during the 1970s, thanks to cheap international credit and encouraged by popular demand for improved social infrastructure. After 1980, refinancing their external debt became more costly for socialist countries as western creditors raised interest rates in an attempt to combat inflation at home. In the context of the Cold War, autarky was the logical, albeit self-destructive, policy response. Both the Soviet politburo and the COMECON council called upon socialist countries to limit their imports and to cut back drastically on international borrowing. This had damaging consequences for economic growth and productivity. 82 In aggregate terms, even though GDP continued to increase, domestic absorption effectively stagnated. As governments struggled to satisfy demands to expand public services, increase the availability of consumer goods, and improve housing, investment in machinery became the prime victim of austerity. 83 Our estimates have shown that the shrinking share of national income available for investment was shifted from equipment towards construction. Paradoxically, as communist regimes were nearing their collapse, they disbursed record sums for building projects. Social housing programmes are partly to blame, but equally responsible was the construction of nuclear power plants in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, precisely with the aim of reducing the dependence of both countries on imported hydrocarbons.
These external shocks and the policy response they invoked prevented both the expansion and modernization of production capacities. The need to improve their balance of trade forced socialist countries to promote exports at all costs. To achieve this, they diverted investment to low-productivity sectors with relatively strong export potential in hard-currency markets, especially food products. Deflationary policies (most notably in Czechoslovakia) seeking to dampen the impact of rising energy prices and to improve trade balances also hampered investment and productivity. 84 The need to curtail imports from hard-currency areas may have also contributed to slower productivity growth by making it harder to implement advanced western technologies. 85 Low levels of equipment investment and hard-currency constraints on the import of western technology implied slow growth in productive capacity and sluggish technological progress as well as employment creation. Therefore, austerity affected both input growth and productivity negatively. This argument is supported by previous research on the importance of machinery investment for productivity. 86 It also corresponds with recent evidence pointing to the conditionality of technological gains on sufficiently high capital-labour ratios, and thus investment. 87 Labour input declined further because of the shortening of the official workweek and popular welfare measures, including very generous maternity benefits and a low retirement age for women, that diminished female labour participation after it had increased robustly for decades.
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Although the 1980s demonstrated these common features in most socialist countries, the severity of the crisis varied because the strength of the external shocks was not uniform. In Poland, GDP per capita fell between 1980 and 1989. After reckless borrowing in the 1970s, the Polish government was the first to declare insolvency in the wake of the second oil shock, before the avalanche of Latin American defaults began. Extreme austerity and the return to violent political repression under General Jaruzelski spurred popular dissent. The Solidarity strikes reduced manufacturing output, which further curbed resources for investment. 89 Czechoslovakia, by contrast, recorded the highest growth rates in eastern Europe after the Soviet Union. 90 Because of limited borrowing in the 1970s, Czechoslovakia did not need to tighten the belt as much as other countries, and therefore could maintain higher levels of investment. Machinery investment declined less drastically than in Hungary and Poland. Hungary represents a special case within the Soviet bloc. It managed to ease the pressure of austerity by maintaining access to western credit after it joined the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in 1982.
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Why did socialist economies fail? The falling behind of eastern Europe in income per capita and productivity during the Cold War has been blamed on the intrinsic 84 Brada, 'Technological progress', p. 439. 85 Whitesell, 'Influence', p. 241. 86 de Long, 'Productivity growth'; de Long and Summers, 'Equipment investment'. 87 Kumar and Russel, 'Technological change'; Allen, 'Technology and the great divergence'. 88 See Adam, 'Employment policies'. 89 For a discussion, see Berend, Central and eastern Europe, ch. 7. 90 As a leading exporter of hydrocarbons, the USSR maintained high investment levels after 1980 and, consequently, achieved the highest growth rates in eastern Europe in both GDP and GDP per capita; see Maddison, World economy, inefficiencies of central planning. This view is widely accepted in both the theoretical and the empirical literature. According to most of the existing growth accounts for eastern Europe, the inefficiencies of socialism were manifested in the productivity failure that brought economic growth to a standstill by the 1980s and undermined the viability of communism. Planned economies, it has been argued, failed because they were bound to. By construction, they were incapable of a successful transition from an extensive growth model to one driven by innovation and rising productivity.
While we accept that socialism was relatively inefficient, we argue that the socialist growth experience requires revision. Official statistics not only overstated the growth of national income but also the rate of capital accumulation. Planned economic development was not as capital-intensive as previous research has suggested. Productivity growth never came to a standstill and certainly did not go into reverse. The growth retardation of the 1980s in east-central Europe did not result from the failure to sustain productivity growth but mainly from the failure to sustain factor accumulation. As in many other late-developing regions, this was the outcome of powerful exogenous shocks. Unlike in the Soviet Union, the oil shocks and the debt crises that emerged in their aftermath invoked austerity, and investment in new machinery fell victim to it. This caused growing technological backwardness, structural sclerosis, and even employment contraction. By reducing investment in new equipment, austerity also contributed to the lack of innovation after the era of mass production, and thus the widening technological gap with advanced market economies that the literature has emphasized. The policy response to the crisis undermined the legitimacy of the socialist system and brought about its collapse, or at least accelerated its downfall. 
